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 Abstract 
Studies on the role of regions in the EU policy process concentrate mainly on policy 
formulation and implementation of regional funds. In this article, we redress this bias by 
investigating the formal role of subnational authorities in the implementation of EU regulatory 
policies, specifically in the transposition of directives. Subnational authorities play a 
secondary, but increasingly important, role in the application of these measures. Their impact 
is greater on environmental and social policies, as also on public contract legislation. More 
decentralized states display higher levels of subnational involvement but, in these states, 
regional participation in national policymaking and a high number of regional authorities 
decrease the likelihood of finding subnational measures of transposition. There is also more 
subnational involvement in states with territories that have both an elected government as 
well as special arrangements regulating their relations with the EU. Finally, subnational 
involvement tends to prolong the process of transposition. 
Zusammenfassung 
Studien zur Rolle von Regionen in der EU-Politik konzentrierten sich bislang hauptsächlich 
auf die politische Aushandlung und Implementation von Strukturfonds. In diesem Beitrag 
möchten wir diese Schieflage durch eine Untersuchung der formalen Rolle subnationaler 
Verwaltungen bei der Implementation von EU-Regulierungen, insbesondere bei der 
Umsetzung von Richtlinien, zurechtrücken. Subnationale Verwaltungen spielen eine 
zweitrangige, aber zunehmend wichtige Rolle bei der Anwendung dieser Maßnahmen. Ihr 
Einfluss ist relativ groß in der Umwelt- und Sozialpolitik, ebenso bei der Verhinderung von 
Korruption bei der Vergabe öffentlicher Aufträge. In dezentralen Staaten zeigt sich eine 
höhere Stufe subnationaler Einbindung, allerdings verringert sich durch die Beteiligung der 
Regionen an der nationalen Politik und durch eine hohe Anzahl an regionalen 
Verwaltungsbehörden die Wahrscheinlichkeit, subnationale Umsetzungsinitiativen zu finden. 
Außerdem ist die subnationale Einbindung stärker in Staaten mit regionalen Gebieten, die 
sowohl über eine gewählte Regierung als auch über eine spezielle Vereinbarung zu ihren 
EU-Beziehungen verfügen. Schließlich kann subnationale Einbindung zu einer Verlängerung 
des Umsetzungsprozesses führen. 
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Introduction:  
Regionalisation and the EU Better Regulation Agenda 
Regionalisation has been on the increase in the European Union (EU) over the last two 
decades.
1 According to a recently developed index (Hooghe, Schakel and Marks 2008), 
since the early 1990s, thirteen EU states increased their regional authority,
2 one country 
(Belgium) decreased it, and the remaining thirteen member states made no change. The 
process of European integration could have indirectly contributed to these developments 
(Börzel 2002). Certainly, the EU tried over the years to deal with a growing mobilisation of 
subnational authorities, which were pushing for more say in its decision-making process 
(Hooghe 1995). The most obvious measures were the establishment of the Committee of the 
Regions, the rewording in the Maastricht Treaty of Article 203 EC that allowed a member 
state to be represented in the Council of Ministers by a regional government, and the setting-
up of procedures to safeguard the implementation of the subsidiarity principle (Committee of 
the Regions 2005). 
Does this growing regionalization, in conjunction with the greater involvement of subnational 
actors in the EU policy process, pose a challenge for the achievement of the targets set by 
the ‘better regulation’ agenda? The main objective of this programme is to improve the 
quality of EU legislation by overhauling the process through which rules are created, 
implemented and revised (Hardacre 2008). Better rules facilitate correct functioning of the 
internal market and achievement of the growth and competitiveness goals of the Lisbon 
Strategy (Commission of the EC 2007). A policy analyst committed to attain a better 
regulatory environment cannot, therefore, ignore the role that subnational authorities (SNAs) 
play (Baliu 2008; Persson and Fandel 2007). 
The increasing involvement of SNAs in the EU policy process is both an opportunity and a 
risk. Broader participation may be in line with the subsidiarity principle and represent a partial 
solution for the EU legitimacy problems. Additionally, consulting street-level implementers 
provides EU legislators and the Commission with a more realistic view of what is necessary 
and feasible on the ground (Tömmel 1998). Finally, it gives SNAs an opportunity to improve 
their knowledge of EU policy objectives, working methods and instruments, which are no 
longer considered an external imposition (Commission of the EC 2001:12-14). 
                                                       
1 Regionalisation is a process of power decentralisation from the state to a regional authority defined as a ‘territorial 
entity situated between the local and national levels which has a capacity for authoritative decision making’ (Marks, 
Hooghe and Schakel 2008:113). In this work, the terms region and subnational authority are used interchangeably. 
Additionally, although the empirical section of this work is centred solely on the European Community pillar of the 
Treaty on European Union, the terms European Union and EU are used throughout, instead of European 
Community. 
2 These are the Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, 
Romania, Slovakia, Spain and UK. 2 — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — I H S 
 
But SNA involvement has its price, too. Their participation at the consultation stage inevitably 
multiplies the number of conflicting preferences that have to be aggregated. When a 
compromise is reached, it may often affect legal clarity. In implementation, SNAs do not, 
perhaps, possess an ‘understanding of the EU policy process as a whole, which then 
enables them to have a clearer view of potential or actual infringements and the stance the 
Commission is likely to take’ (Dimitrakopoulos and Richardson 2001:339). Tensions may 
arise when an EU law envisages a single implementing authority but the competence for 
dealing with a particular issue is not the exclusive attribute of the national level (Mandelkern 
Group on Better Regulation 2001:50). Additionally, the Commission cannot exert pressure 
directly on SNAs, because it is the central government which, under Article 226 EC, is 
responsible vis-à-vis the EU for infringements committed by its subnational authorities. In 
sum, SNA involvement represents yet another point in the policy cycle where slippages or 
outright failures could occur, thus increasing the implementation deficit that  is said to afflict 
the EU (Mastenbroek 2005). 
In light of this discussion, the focus of this article is the formal
3 subnational involvement in 
the implementation of EU regulatory policies that take the form of directives. Whereas there 
is evidence that the political profile of subnational actors in the EU is on the rise, this issue 
has been studied only marginally. Academic works have dealt primarily with two topics: the 
role of regional institutions in the design of policies and in the management of structural 
funds. The next section briefly reviews these contributions and presents an overview of 
those works on implementation and compliance that assess the impact of SNAs. The 
following section looks at a stage of the implementation process that is directly relevant to 
the better regulation agenda: the transposition of EU directives. This part of the article 
presents evidence of SNA involvement in the transposition of directives across time, policy 
sectors and member states, employing a new dataset on national transposition processes 
covering the time-span of 1978 to 2004. Thereafter, the article explains the variance in SNA 
involvement and evaluates its consequences in terms of timeliness of transposition. 
 
                                                       
3 Involvement is formal when SNAs directly adopt national measures of implementation. It is informal if SNAs are 
merely consulted by central state authorities. I H S — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — 3 
Subnational Authorities as Policy-takers: The Implementation 
of EU Regulatory Policies 
The literature covering the regional activities in the EU policy process may be arranged 
following a widely used partition between upstream (policy formulation and decision) and 
downstream (implementation) policy processes. With regard to the role of regions as policy-
makers, some researchers have investigated the channels available to regional authorities 
which wish to project their preferences on the European stage, namely their lobbying 
practices and their representation in EU institutions such as the Committee of the Regions or 
the Council of Ministers (e.g. Bomberg and Peterson 1998; Tatham 2008). Another group of 
researchers have studied the formation and effectiveness of inter-regional associations, 
formed both within and across the member states (e.g. Weyand 1997). Finally, others have 
proposed to investigate those channels of intermediation with the EU that are presided by 
central state authorities (e.g. Jeffery 2000). 
As regards the downstream side of the policy process, most works have focused on the 
management of EU regional funds, namely on redistributive policies. These studies have 
assessed the policy and institutional outcome of the implementation of these funds (e.g. 
Bache 2004; Hooghe 1996). The prevalence of this type of research is not a surprise. There 
is no other policy sector where regional authorities have come to play a comparable role. 
Nevertheless, subnational authorities are also involved in the implementation of EU 
legislation, which has a predominantly regulatory nature. This area, therefore, needs further 
investigation. The remainder of the section will provide an overview over those works whose 
main object of study is, broadly, implementation and compliance but which take into account 
the impact of SNAs as well. 
In the 1980s, scholars studying the implementation of the single market programme already 
recognised the importance of streamlining the coordination between central and subnational 
administrations in federal or regional states, such as Belgium, Germany, Italy and Spain. 
Siedentopf and Ziller (1988: 45, 60), for instance, observed that these procedures were not 
yet fully developed in these states and that the allocation of responsibilities between 
governmental levels was unclear, especially in Italy and Belgium where decentralisation was 
relatively recent.
4 They also observed that ‘the incorporation process reflects a certain 
unwillingness of the subnational levels to comply with […] measures on whose substance 
they had had no influence’ (Siedentopf and Ziller 1988: 45). 
The second wave of researchers focused on the goodness-of-fit hypothesis, which argues 
that the adaptation pressure exerted by the EU on member states is determined by the 
degree of fit between EU legal obligations and either existing national paradigms and 
                                                       
4 See also Rhodes (1986) and, for a recent similar argument related to the divergent transposition performances of 
unitary (Denmark) and federal (Belgium) states, Bursens (2002). 4 — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — I H S 
 
administrative traditions (institutional misfit) or domestic policy instruments (policy misfit) 
(e.g. Börzel and Risse 2003; Knill and Lenschow 1998; see the reviews of Mastenbroek 
2005; and Treib 2008). Knill and Lenschow (1998), for instance, argue that  national 
administrative traditions, comprising, among other things, the vertically and horizontally 
distributed administrative competences, obstruct the implementation of environmental 
directives, particularly when they call for the creation of an agency whose mandate overlaps 
regional competence or requires the establishment of regional coordination structures, which 
were thus far nonexistent. 
Haverland (2000), however, has a counterargument to this reasoning. He argues that the 
opposition to the packaging directive by Länder, channelled through the Bundesrat, was the 
central reason for Germany’s poor implementation of the directive as compared to that of the 
UK and the Netherlands (where the misfit with the directive was higher). Germany’s strong 
bicameralism and federalism provided domestic interests hostile to the directive with a veto 
power. Yet, in their research on transport policy in Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK and 
France, Hèritier et al. (2001) conclude that a consensual political leadership may offset the 
potential obstacles to policy change associated with a strong subnational tier of government. 
Besides the institutional misfit, state-region intergovernmental relations may play a role as 
well. According to Börzel (1998), the better performance of Germany, as compared to that of 
Spain, in the implementation of some environmental policies may be explained by its 
cooperative federalism, which favoured the sharing of implementation costs and the 
participation of subnational authorities, as opposed to the Spanish competitive regionalism 
that relied on burden shifting and limited involvement. 
Against the backdrop of this qualitative literature, a few large-N studies have analysed how 
the distribution of powers across different levels of government impacted on compliance 
performances. The results obtained are mutually contradictory. Mbaye (2001) shows that 
member states with greater regional autonomy are more likely to infringe EU law, but Giuliani 
(2003) and Jensen (2007) fail to confirm this finding.
5 Linos (2007) and Thomson (2007, 
2009) find that decentralized countries take longer time to comply with social policy 
directives. Giuliani (2003) and Haverland and Romeijn (2007) however find no significant 
association between federalism and delay in transposition. What accounts for these 
differences? In some cases, the object of investigation – infringement or delay – and its 
measurement differ, while in others the research is limited to a single policy area or a few 
countries. Also, these works employ different indexes of regional autonomy. Nevertheless, in 
a recent analysis of all the directives adopted between 1986 and 2002, König and Luetgert 
(2009) confirm the association between federalism and delay. 
                                                       
5 The results reported by Lampinen and Uusikylä (1998) are more difficult to interpret. The variable ‘political 
institutions’ is significantly associated with the failure to implement directives. But, this is an index composed of 
thirteen factors; it is therefore difficult to discern the impact of regional autonomy, which is one of the building blocks, 
from that of other components. I H S — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — 5 
In conclusion, since the mid 1980s, the study of transposition consolidated itself into an 
important subfield of EU research (Treib 2008). These works have the merit of drawing 
attention to the timely and correct transposition of EU directives, which constitutes a decisive 
prerequisite for the realisation of the Lisbon Agenda. Nevertheless, despite the recent 
interest of the Commission (under the better regulation initiative) and of other institutional 
actors, such as the Scottish Parliament (European and External Relations Committee 2008), 
scholars have so far mostly neglected the subnational dimension (Allio and Fandel 2006). 
The next section describes the pattern of formal involvement of SNAs across time, member 
states and sectors using an original dataset that allows one to discriminate between the 
national and the subnational measures employed to transpose a large sample of directives. 6 — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — I H S 
 
The Involvement of SNAs in the Transposition of EU 
Directives: Descriptive Statistics 
We have collected information on 11,859 national measures transposing 733 directives 
adopted in fifteen member states between December 1978 and December 2004 from the 
CELEX database of the European Union.
6  The directives were selected randomly and the 
implementing measures classified based on who adopted them: national parliaments, the 
cabinet or other executive institution, such as ministries or national agencies, or subnational 
authorities. We excluded national measures that have been adopted on or prior to the date 
of adoption of the directive, those without a date of adoption and, for those member states 
joining the EU after 1978, the directives which predated the accession date.
7 
We considered measures taken only by subnational authorities with an elected assembly 
that appoints a regional executive.
8 These include mainly the Austrian and German Länder, 
the Danish and Swedish counties, the Dutch provinces, the Finnish regions, the Italian 
provinces and regions and the Spanish autonomous communities. They also include the 
French regions since 1982, the Greek prefectures since 1984, the Irish county councils and, 
since 1994, regional authorities, the Belgian provinces and, as they became more 
representative during the 1980s, communities and regions, and finally, the British counties, 
when these existed, and its devolved administrations as they increased powers in the 1990s. 
Table 1 provides an overview of the number of directives and subnational measures per 
member state and some examples of subnational measures present in our dataset. 
 
 
 
                                                       
6 CELEX was no longer accessible after this cut-off point. Its content was migrated to the EUR-Lex database, 
available at: www.eur-lex.europa.eu. CELEX manual states that parts of the database are incomplete (e.g. sector 5 
on preparatory acts before 1984) but this does not apply to the two sectors from which information was collected 
(sector 5 on secondary legislation and sector 7 on national implementing measures). For instance, the database 
lists 341 directives adopted in the five years prior to 1984 and 410 directives in the following five years. A mere 
difference of 70 directives (14 directives per year) between the period of ‘Eurosclerosis’ (pre 1984) and that of 
implementation of the single market programme (between 1984 and 1988) does not seem to indicate that the record 
is incomplete before 1984. See König and Luetgert (2009: 170-2) for a discussion on the reliability of this database. 
7 From an initial random sample of 821 directives, 733 directives display at least one national implementing measure 
adopted in at least one member state after the date of adoption of the directive. This sample is quite representative 
of the Eur-Lex database. We have 314 Commission directives (38.6 percent), while the database lists 872 
Commission directives out of a total of 2358 directives adopted in the same time period (37 percent); 258 and 262 
are agricultural and internal market measures respectively (31.4 and 31.9 percent) compared to 769 and 914 (32.6 
and 38.9 percent) respectively in the database. 
8 In other words, authorities with a representation score of at least 1,1 in the index developed by Hooghe, Marks and 
Schakel (2008). I H S — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — 7 
Table 1 Measures of subnational authorities 
Member state  No. 
directives 
No. of SNA 
measures 
Examples of subnational measures 
Austria 214  235 
Landesgesetz, Verordnung der 
Landesregierung 
Belgium 575 192 
Arrêté du Gouvernement (Wallon, 
Flammand), Arrêté du Gouvernement 
de la Communauté française 
Finland 235 90 
Landskapslag, Ålands 
Landskapsstyrelses Beslut, 
Landskapsförordning 
Germany 474  169  Landesgesetz, Landesverordnung 
Italy 566  12 
Legge Regionale, Decreto del 
Presidente della Giunta Regionale 
Netherlands 496  3  Provinciale Verordening 
Portugal 491  3 
Decreto Legislativo Regional, Decreto 
regulamentar regional (Madeira, 
Açores) 
Spain 502  5  Ley de la Comunidad Autónoma, 
Orden de la Comunidad Autónoma 
United 
Kingdom 
528 213  Act, Regulation, Order 
Note: We found 9,704 executive, 1,233 legislative and 922 subnational measures. No subnational 
measures were found for Denmark (499 directives), France (538), Greece (527), Ireland (536), 
Luxembourg (558) and Sweden (208). 
The first important finding is that formal subnational involvement in the transposition of EU 
directives has been quite a limited phenomenon so far. We have found at least one 
subnational act in only 4.3 percent of the processes of transposition. Considering only the 
states listed in Table 1, this figure rises to 7.4 percent. Nonetheless, there has been an 
increase in subnational participation over the years. SNAs were involved in 2.8 percent of 8 — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — I H S 
 
transposition processes up to the mid-90s. The figure has subsequently moved up to 6.3 
percent, predominantly because of the enlargement to Finland and Austria and devolution in 
Britain.
9 Subnational involvement could also have been underestimated, because, at least 
for the directives adopted after 2000, our data could be right-censored in a way that it is 
biased against subnational measures, which, as will be shown later, generally take longer 
time to be adopted. 
We find therefore some evidence for the claim of a gradually increasing formal role for SNAs 
(Baliu 2008; Commission of the EC 2001; Persson and Fandel 2007), but this involvement 
remains a minor cause of the EU transposition deficit. One could even argue for more 
subnational participation in policy formulation, given the rather limited role in implementation. 
Figure 1 SNA involvement per member state 
 
Figure 1 illustrates SNA involvement across member states, that is, the percentage of the 
national transposition processes of the sampled directives that include at least one 
subnational measure. There are indeed some unexpected results. In Finland, more than one 
in four directives lists at least one SNA act among the national transposition measures. This 
                                                       
9 Had the observations gone further back to the 1970s, one might have observed a rise in subnational involvement 
following the establishment of the Belgian communities and regions. On the other hand, it is difficult to speculate on 
the consequences of the last two enlargements on subnational involvement. Six of the twelve new member states 
display some degree of regional authority (Hooghe, Schakel and Marks 2008), but none has joined REGLEG (see 
the footnote below). 
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is however unrelated to the Finnish regions. It is solely due to the measures taken by the 
government of the Åland Islands, the autonomous and directly elected province of Finland, 
which enjoys a special status and is exempted from some EU policies. On the other hand, it 
is somewhat surprising that Britain has the second largest share of SNAs measures. Besides 
the measures of the overseas territory of Gibraltar, which also enjoys a special status, the 
creation of devolved governments with significant policy competence in Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland in the late 1990s strongly regionalised the process of transposition here. On 
the other hand, the presence of an upper chamber representing the regions (or states) could 
explain the lower involvement of SNAs in Germany, Austria and, to a lesser extent, Belgium, 
as compared to that in Britain and Finland. Directives may be transposed through federal 
measures even when policies fall within regional competence. 
It comes as no surprise that old or recent federal states, like Austria, Germany and Belgium, 
rank higher than the countries with strong regional authorities like Spain and Italy 
(interestingly, Dutch provinces appear to be as involved in transposition as Spanish or Italian 
regions). However, this difference cannot be attributed entirely to the more limited 
competence devolved in Spain and Italy. Here, national governments probably take the lead 
in transposing the directives if the distribution of policy responsibilities between central and 
regional authorities is unclear. But more importantly, the task of activating twenty regional 
legislative or executive procedures in Italy and seventeen in Spain for a single directive may 
prove so burdensome that the central government, in consultation with regional actors via 
permanent bodies such as the Spanish conferencias sectoriales and the Italian conferenza 
stato-regioni, often takes the responsibility of initiating the whole process (Bindi and Cisci 
2005). 
In the case of Portugal, regions and districts have weak authority and institutions. As the 
special territory of the Åland Islands in Finland, subnational measures are taken solely by the 
regional governments of the Azores and Madeira. Unlike Finland, however, and at least until 
the constitutional revision of 2004, these measures had to be preceded by acts of the central 
Portuguese authorities. 
In conclusion, with the exception of Gibraltar, the Italian and Dutch provinces, the authorities 
most involved are from regions that belong to REGLEG.
10 No subnational measures were 
found in the remaining member states. French regions,
11 Greek prefectures, Danish and 
Swedish counties, Irish counties and regions do not seem to play any formal role in the 
transposition of the sampled directives. Also, there are no measures in Luxembourg where 
there is no elected regional government. 
                                                       
10 REGLEG is an association of 73 regions with legislative power across eight member states (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain and UK). 
11 Eight French arrêtés préfectoral transposing Council Directive 82/883 are considered national executive 
measures because they were issued by prefects who are central state representatives in a department or region. 10 — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — I H S 
 
Figure 2 SNA involvement per policy area 
 
Moving on to policy areas, Figure 2 illustrates considerable variance in SNA involvement 
here. The rather heavy participation in environmental policy can probably be explained by 
the strong territorial nature of this sector (see Brown 1999) (recall that the Fifth 
Environmental Action Programme in 1993 laid emphasis on shared responsibility, and 
advocated the involvement of stakeholders in improving policy effectiveness). The same 
applies to some measures in agriculture policy and to the directives regulating the tenders of 
public contracts.  
Perhaps more surprising is the role of these authorities in the transposition of social policy 
directives that deal with protection of workers, working conditions and safety at work. But 
social policy is sometimes devolved to the lower tiers of government in countries where 
SNAs are important actors. Finally, it should not come as a surprise that areas that regulate 
taxation, home affairs, public health, market transactions and transport tend to exclude 
SNAs. 
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Explaining Subnational Involvement 
How does one explain these patterns of SNA participation in the transposition of directives? 
A natural expectation is that involvement is more likely in more decentralized countries. But 
this observation has to be qualified on at least two accounts. First, we should expect fewer 
subnational measures of transposition in decentralised states where regional governments 
can, directly or through their representatives, influence policy at the national level. In other 
words, where regional interests are taken into account in the national decision-making 
process, we are likely to see fewer regional measures. Second, regional transposition is 
likely to be unwieldy in decentralised states with a large number of subnational authorities. In 
these circumstances, we should expect national transposition, possibly sustained by 
coordination mechanisms such as state-regions committees, to replace formal SNA 
participation.
12 In this section, we subject these two conditional hypotheses to an empirical 
test. 
The dependent variable, subnational involvement, takes a score of one if at least one 
national implementing measure is adopted by a subnational authority, and zero otherwise. 
We have then selected two frequently used decentralisation indices and the self-rule 
component of the regional authority index recently developed by Hooghe, Marks and 
Schakel (2008). The five-point ordinal scale of federalism and decentralisation of Lijphart 
(1999: 189) ranks countries according to whether they are federal and decentralised, federal 
and centralised, semi-federal, unitary and decentralised, unitary and centralised. With the 
exception of Belgium, the index does not vary over time. Lane and Ersson’s (1999: 187) 
index of institutional autonomy sums up four discrete components (federalism, special 
territorial autonomy, functional autonomy and local government discretion) producing a (time-
invariant) five-point decentralisation scale. The self-rule index recently developed by 
Hooghe, Marks and Schakel (2008; 2008) measures the authority exercised by a regional 
government over those living in its territory, and comprises four dimensions (institutional 
depth, policy scope, fiscal autonomy and representation) that are summed up as a sixteen-
point index. Hooghe, Schakel and Marks (2008) produce a score for each regional reform 
from 1950 to 2006. 
To measure the influence that regional governments exercise at the national level, we 
employ the shared rule component of Hooghe, Marks and Schakel’s regional authority index. 
Shared rule measures the authority exercised by a regional government or its 
representatives in the country as a whole and comprises four dimensions (law making, 
executive control, fiscal control and constitutional reform) to produce a ten-point index for the 
1950-2006 time period. In decentralised countries, we expect less subnational involvement 
in transposition as shared rule increases. 
                                                       
12 Of course, these dynamics are not at work in more centralised countries where one simply expects less 
subnational involvement.  12 — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — I H S 
 
For the second expectation, we have counted, for each country and relevant time period, the 
number of SNAs at the highest tier of regional government, but above communes and 
municipalities, with an elected assembly that appoints a regional executive.
13 For instance, 
until 1979, we have counted the ten Belgian provinces and, as they increased 
representativeness from 1980 onwards, the regions and communities. In decentralised 
countries, we expect less subnational involvement in transposition as the number of SNAs 
increases. 
We also include a set of control variables. Firstly, we add dummy variables for policies, as 
listed in Figure 2, using taxation and home affairs as the reference category. Second, as can 
be seen from the descriptive statistics, several member states have special relations with 
some territories across the world whose measures are listed in our dataset. We employ 
therefore special territory as a dummy variable that takes the value of one for member states 
with outermost regions or other special territories that only partially apply EU law and have 
an elected government.
14 However, since Hooghe, Schakel and Marks’ self-rule index 
specifically takes into account special autonomous regions, whereas it is unclear whether 
other indicators do, we exclude this control variable in the regression with this index. 
As directives are adopted at the supranational level and then transposed by the member 
states, the structure of our dataset appears hierarchical. Policy dummies are directive-level 
observations, while the three decentralisation indices, shared rule, the number of SNAs and 
special territory are country-level observations nested into the directive-level. To assess 
whether there is significant variation in the probability of subnational involvement at the 
directive level, we estimated a two-level random effects ANOVA model.
15 The coefficient of 
the directive-level variance component is 0.16 with a standard error of 0.015 (state-level N= 
6,947, directive-level N = 733). This value is greater than zero at a significance level above 
0.01, implying that a significant proportion of the variance in the probability of subnational 
involvement is attributable to differences between directives, supporting the expectation that 
our dataset is structured into two levels. We therefore estimate two-level probit models with 
random-intercept and robust standard errors for data clustered at the state level to account 
for correlation within each country. 
 
                                                       
13 In other words, with a representation score of at least 1,1 (Hooghe, Schakel and Marks 2008). 
14 These are Finland (Åland), France (French Guiana, Guadeloupe, Martinique), Germany (Büsingen am Hochrhein, 
Heligoland), Great Britain (Channel Islands, Isle of Man, Gibraltar), Italy (Campione d'Italia, Livigno), Portugal 
(Azores, Madeira) and Spain (Canary Islands, Ceuta, Melilla). Mount Athos is also a special territory but its civil 
governor is appointed by the Greek minister of foreign affairs. Overseas countries and territories are disregarded 
because they are not part of the EU and their relationship is governed by association agreements. 
15 This analysis of cross-level variation follows Steenbergen and Jones (2002:224,231). We opted for a binomial 
model with a probit link function because subnational involvement reflects an underlying interval variable. Hence, its 
cumulative distribution is normal. I H S — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — 13 
Table 2 The determinants of formal SNA involvement in transposition 
Dependent variable: Subnational involvement 
Parameters I  II  III 
Fixed Effects     
Intercept  -5.017   
(0.381)
**   
 
-5.354   
(0.386)
** 
-3.737   
(0.392)
**    
 
Decentralization indices:       
              - Lijphart  0.829   
(0.077)
**      - - 
              - Lane and Ersson  -  0.843 
(0.078)
**  - 
              - Self rule (Hooghe et al.)  -  -  0.070   
(0.005)
** 
Shared rule  0.131   
(0.031)
**     
-0.244 
(0.081)
**    
0.014    
(0.027)     
Number of SNAs  0.069   
(0.006)
**     
0.060   
(0.005)
** 
0.067   
(0.004)
** 
Shared rule × Lijphart  -0.041   
(0.007)
**      - - 
                   × Lane and Ersson  -  0.033 
(0.022)  - 
                   × Self rule (Hooghe et al.)  -  -  -0.0002   
(0.002)     
Number of SNAs × Lijphart  -0.051   
(0.005)
**  - - 
                            × Lane and Ersson  -  -0.039   
(0.005)
**  - 
                            × Self rule (Hooghe et al.)  -  -  -0.006   
(0.0004)
**   
Special territory  1.136    
(0.070)
**     
1.328   
(0.091)
**  - 
Agriculture  1.071   
(0.362)
**     
1.098   
(0.347)
** 
1.012   
(0.385)
**     
Environment  1.694 
(0.410)
**     
1.721   
(0.378)
** 
1.580   
(0.373)
**     
Industry and trade  0.962 
(0.398)
*  
0.975   
(0.328)
** 
0.892   
(0.351)
*     
Public administration  1.238  
(0.472)
*     
1.240 
(0.558)
* 
1.251   
(0.588)
*     
Public health  0.730   
(0.569)      
0.732    
(0.278)
* 
0.689   
(0.527)     
Social affairs  1.545   
(0.396)
**     
1.634    
(0.429)
** 
1.426   
(0.365)
**     
Transport  0.700   
(0.302)
*   
0.709 
(0.403) 
0.667   
(0.401)     
Random Effects     
Variance, intercept 
0.123 
(0.044)
* 
0.144 
(0.031)
* 
0.113 
(0.040)
* 
Log-likelihood -1039.834  -1019.329  -1090.719 
Note:  Two-level probit regressions with random-intercept and robust standard errors clustered on 
country level. N= 6,947 (directive-level N=733). 
** = p < .01, 
* = p < .05. Policy reference category: 
taxation and home affairs. 14 — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — I H S 
 
Table 2 illustrates the regression results. The substantive interpretation of the coefficients of 
a probit model, especially if it contains interaction terms, is not straightforward. For instance, 
the marginal effect of the decentralisation indices on the probability of subnational 
involvement depends on the values of the conditioning (i.e. shared rule and the number of 
SNAs) as well as dummy variables. The three coefficients of the decentralisation indices in 
Table 2 are positive and significant as expected, indicating that greater decentralisation 
increases the likelihood of subnational involvement when shared rule equals zero and 
subnational authorities do not exist. This, however, is substantively less meaningful because 
only France, Greece and Luxembourg display these features but none of them has 
subnational transposition measures. Nevertheless, suffice to say that the majority of the 
countries with no subnational measures display below average levels of decentralisation, 
while the majority of the top five countries listed in Figure 1 have above average levels of 
decentralisation.
16 
To test the validity of the first conditional hypothesis, we mapped in Figure 3 the marginal 
effect and the 95 percent confidence intervals of a increase in shared rule (specifically six 
units, slightly less than two standard deviations, which is the difference between Spain and 
Germany) on the likelihood of subnational involvement in the transposition of an 
environmental directive across the different degrees of decentralisation.
17 The top two charts 
conform to the expectation. In more decentralised countries, we are less likely to find 
subnational measures if regional authorities have greater influence in the country as a whole. 
Providing real life examples is hard because countries simultaneously vary along the degree 
of shared rule and several other dimensions. Nevertheless, we would be between 2 and 2.5 
percent less likely to find subnational measures of transposition if a decentralised country 
like Austria increases the degree of shared rule by a standard deviation. This is equivalent to 
the difference between Austria and the similarly decentralised Belgium and this may account 
for the more limited involvement in transposition of Belgian communities and regions as 
compared to Austrian Länder, despite fewer SNAs in Belgium. These results should be 
interpreted somewhat cautiously, however, because the expectation finds no support when 
self-rule is used as the measure of decentralisation. 
 
 
 
                                                       
16 A table listing the marginal effect of the decentralisation indices and its standard error for each member state is 
available with the authors. 
17 The marginal effects and confidence intervals have been produced following the code developed by Brambor, 
Clark and Golder (2006). We took 10,000 draws from the estimated coefficients and the variance-covariance matrix. 
In Figure 3, number of SNAs is set at 15, while in Figure 4, shared rule is set at 2.4. I H S — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — 15 
Figure 3 The impact of shared rule on subnational involvement at different levels of 
decentralization 
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Figure 4 The impact of the number of SNAs on subnational involvement at different 
levels of decentralization 
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The second hypothesis is more convincingly validated as can be seen from Figure 4. The 
figure illustrates the marginal effect and confidence intervals of an increase in the number of 
subnational authorities (specifically eleven units, slightly less than a standard deviation, 
which is equivalent to the difference between Austria and Italy) on the likelihood of 
subnational involvement across the degrees of decentralisation. In more decentralised 
countries, we are less likely to find subnational measures as the number of SNAs increases. 
If the number of Belgian SNAs increases from the current five to sixteen (as in Spain), we 
would be 10.3 to 19.2 percent less likely to find subnational measures in Belgium. 
As regards the remaining factors, we are 11.8 to 15.8 percent more likely to find subnational 
measures when states have territories that enjoy a special relationship with the EU. These 
regional authorities need to adopt and communicate to the EU their own measures, which 
are likely to differ from those of their national governments. Finally, as already seen in Figure 
2, environmental and social policy directives are 3.0 to 9.6 percent more likely to involve 
SNAs in transposition. Measures on public administration, agriculture and industry are also 
significantly more likely to involve SNAs than do the home affairs and taxation directives; 
however, it is less so in the case of public health and transport directives. 18 — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — I H S 
 
The Consequences of Subnational Involvement 
What are the consequences of involving subnational authorities in the transposition of 
directives? Does SNA involvement prolong transposition and compliance with EU law? In 
this section, we take as our unit of analysis the national measures transposing the directives 
and we analyse the timing of their adoption. As several observations have only the year of 
adoption, our time variable, transposition, counts the number of calendar years that elapsed 
between the adoptions of the directive and the national measure, starting with the value of 
one if the two adoptions fall in the same calendar year. To avoid the risk of selection bias 
(Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 19), directives without national implementing measures 
in 2006 are treated as right-censored observations. A total of 3,053 national transposition 
processes fall into this category. 
As explained earlier, the implementing measures have been classified depending on who 
adopted them: the legislature, the executive or subnational authorities. This classification 
allows us to generate two dichotomous explanatory variables, subnational measure for 
implementing acts adopted by a subnational authority
18 and legislative measure for those 
adopted by the national parliament, leaving executive acts as the reference category. 
Legislative  measure allows us to control for the impact of parliamentary involvement on 
transposition. As in the case of decentralisation, the results do not seem to point in the same 
direction. Berglund, Gange and Van Waarden (2006), for utilities and food safety, and 
Haverland and Romeijn (2007), for social policy, do not find any association between 
parliamentary involvement and delay, while, in their more comprehensive study, König and 
Luetgert (2009) find a significant negative relation between legislative participation and 
delay. In the Netherlands, involvement delays transposition initially but accelerates it later 
(Mastenbroek 2003). However, in Italy (Borghetto, Franchino and Giannetti 2006) and in 
maritime policy (Steunenberg and Kaeding 2009) it behaves in the opposite way.
19 
We include other control variables that are used in the literature as well. Commission 
directive is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for a Commission directive and 
zero for a Council or Parliament (where involved) directive, while amending directive takes 
the value of one if the directive amends an existing EU law. Deadline  is a time-varying 
covariate that takes the value of one in risk periods where the deadline for transposing a 
given directive has expired. These factors should accelerate transposition (Borghetto, 
                                                       
18 This variable is measured at the level of the national acts transposing a directive in a country. Earlier works that 
analyse the implications of decentralisation for compliance employ coarser indices that do not vary across the 
directives implemented within a country (Giuliani 2003; Haverland and Romeijn 2007; König and Luetgert 2009; 
Linos 2007, Thomson 2007, 2009). 
19 Legislative measure and subnational measure do not take any value in right-censored observations. We have 
rerun the Cox regression without right-censored observations. Results do not change. I H S — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — 19 
Franchino and Giannetti 2006; Mastenbroek 2003; Steunenberg and Kaeding 2009; but see 
Haverland and Romeijn 2007). Finally, we include dummy variables for each member state. 
The transposition of a directive may involve the adoption of more than one national measure 
without a predetermined sequence. The primary interest of this study is in the relationship 
between the covariates and transposition, and no explicit inferences need to be made about 
duration dependency. Therefore, as recommended by Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004), 
we employ the Cox proportional hazards model with robust standard errors clustered on the 
directives.
20 
Table 3 illustrates the regression results, while Figure 5 maps the effect of the covariates on 
the likelihood of adopting national measures over a given time period after the adoption of 
the directive. The most important finding is that involvement of SNAs decreases the hazard 
ratio; in other words, it prolongs the process of transposition. Subnational measures are two 
and a half times less likely of being adopted within the same calendar year of adoption of the 
directive than other types of national implementing measures. The change in the hazard rate 
becomes positive, that is subnational measures are more likely to be adopted, only after 
more than two years. But only thirty-six percent of national measures are adopted after this 
time period, which is well beyond the mean deadline of one year for transposition. This 
evidence lends support, at the finer level of the single national implementing measure, to the 
broader association between federalism and delay (König and Luetgert 2009; Linos 2007; 
Thomson 2007, 2009). 
 
  
                                                       
20 As post-estimation diagnostic tests, we have employed the link test and inspected the Cox-Snell residuals to 
assess the appropriateness of the Cox specification. Each covariate was also plotted against the martingale 
residuals to assess if their functional form was correct. Finally, we used the Schoenfeld residuals to test if the 
covariates violated the proportional hazards assumption and, following Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004: 131-7), 
we interacted the offending covariates with the natural logarithm of time. The results also hold if these covariates 
are interacted with time only, rather than with its natural logarithm. 20 — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — I H S 
 
Table 3 Involvement of SNAs and timing of adoption of national implementing measures 
Dependent variable: Transposition 
Covariates  
Subnational measure  -0.896
** 
(0.220) 
Subnational measure * ln(t)  0.929
** 
(0.146)
 
Legislative measure  -0.036 
(0.118) 
Legislative measure * ln(t)  0.489
** 
(0.086) 
Commission directive  1.135
** 
(0.103) 
Commission directive * ln(t)  -0.671
** 
(0.092) 
Amending directive  0.361
** 
(0.137) 
Amending directive * ln(t)  -0.387
** 
(0.104) 
Deadline  0.109 
(0.171) 
Deadline * ln(t)  -0.156 
(0.175) 
Belgium  -0.175
* 
(0.074) 
Denmark  0.104 
(0.077) 
Finland  0.302
** 
(0.074) 
France  0.030 
(0.070) 
Germany  -0.200
* 
(0.081) 
Greece  -0.160
* 
(0.072) 
Ireland  -0.112 
(0.072) 
Italy  -0.143 
(0.073) 
Luxembourg  -0.112 
(0.072) 
The Netherlands  -0.031 
(0.076) 
Portugal  0.022 
(0.069) 
Spain  0.152
* 
(0.074) 
Sweden  0.131 
(0.074) 
United Kingdom  0.074 
(0.076) 
Log-likelihood -108065.71 
Note: Cox proportional hazard model. 
** = p < .01, 
* = p < .05. Robust estimators, standard errors in 
parenthesis adjusted for clustering on directives. Breslow method for ties. N (subjects) 15,153, failures 
(transposed directives) 12,100. Reference category for types of implementation acts: executive 
measures. Member state reference category: Austria. I H S — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — 21 
Figure 5 Effects of covariates on the timing of adoption of national implementing 
measures 
 
 
Legislative measures, on the other hand, do not seem to make a significant difference 
initially but, after a year, they speed up transposition and are increasingly more likely to be 
adopted than other type of implementation acts (eighty-six percent of the observations fall 
within this time frame). This lends conditional support to other works. The initial 
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As expected, Commission directives are three times more likely of being transposed in the 
same calendar year of their adoption than the Council (and Parliament) directives are. The 
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the non-amending measures are. The change in hazard ratio turns significantly negative in 
both cases, but only after quite a few years after adoption. This is substantively irrelevant to 
more than eighty percent of the sample. The last notable result is the irrelevance of the 
deadline covariate. Passing the transposition deadline does not seem to speed up 
implementation. I H S — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — 23 
Conclusion 
Regionalisation expanded across the European Union in the last two decades and several 
institutional innovations were made at the EU level to accommodate regional demands for 
more influence on supranational policy making. But the focus of academic work has 
predominantly been on the role of regions in formulation and implementation of regional 
funds. This bias is addressed in this article by investigating the involvement of subnational 
authorities in the implementation of regulatory policies, specifically in the transposition of 
directives. 
Subnational authorities play a secondary but increasingly important formal role in the 
implementation of these measures. Their influence is greater on environmental and social 
policies, as well as on public contract legislation. Moreover, some subnational measures 
have been found transposing directives on other policy fields, such as agriculture, industry 
and trade. Although more decentralised states display higher levels of subnational 
involvement, regional participation in national policymaking and a large number of regional 
authorities decrease the likelihood of finding subnational measures of transposition. Further, 
there is more subnational involvement in states with territories that have both an elected 
government and special relations with the EU. Finally, in light of the better regulation agenda, 
subnational involvement tends to prolong the process of transposition, especially if new 
Council (and Parliament) directives need transposition. 
In conclusion, the study of the role of subnational authorities in implementation is a 
promising research avenue. For instance, closer attention should be paid to SNA 
involvement when the responsibility for transposition lies formally at the national level. Last 
but not least, the issue confronts policy-makers with an important trade-off. On the one hand, 
greater SNA involvement is welcome to the extent that it increases participation and may 
improve policy design. On the other hand, this participation may jeopardise the creation of a 
level-playing field by, for instance, prolonging transposition. After all, a free lunch does not 
seem to exist in politics either. 24 — Borghetto / Franchino / The Role of Subnational Authorities — I H S 
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